&#8220;Piero Sraffa&#8217;s Lectures on the Advanced Theory of Value 1928 - 1931 and the rediscovery of the classical approach&#8221; by Signorino, R.
This article was downloaded by: [Professor Rodolfo Signorino]
On: 22 March 2012, At: 10:08
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Review of Political Economy
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/crpe20
Piero Sraffa's lectures on the advanced
theory of value 1928–31 and the
rediscovery of the classical approach
Rodolfo Signorino a
a Dipartimento di Studi su Politica, Diritto e Società G. Mosca,
Università di Palermo, Italy
Available online: 19 Aug 2006
To cite this article: Rodolfo Signorino (2005): Piero Sraffa's lectures on the advanced theory of
value 1928–31 and the rediscovery of the classical approach, Review of Political Economy, 17:3,
359-380
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09538250500147080
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-
conditions
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation
that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any
instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary
sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings,
demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or
indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Piero Sraffa’s Lectures on the
Advanced Theory of Value 1928–31
and the Rediscovery of the Classical
Approach
RODOLFO SIGNORINO
Dipartimento di Studi su Politica, Diritto e Societa` G. Mosca, Universita` di
Palermo, Italy
ABSTRACT Sraffa’s Lectures on the Advanced Theory of Value 1928–1931 and his two
preparatory Notes of summer and November 1927 provide a wealth of material, up to now
unpublished, for a reconstruction of the early stage of his inquiry into the cognate fields of
pure economic theory and its history. The three manuscripts show that in the late 1920s
Sraffa rejected the Marshallian constant-cost interpretation of classical economics, an
interpretation to which he had adhered in his 1925 and 1926 papers. Moreover, in the
Lectures, Sraffa presents for the first time his own interpretation of classical economics
based on the concepts of surplus, physical real costs and asymmetric treatment of
distributive variables.
1. Introduction
Piero Sraffa’s Archive at the Wren Library of Trinity College, Cambridge,
includes a folder, catalogued as File D2/4, which contains a manuscript, in
Sraffa’s handwriting, of more than 120 pages. The manuscript is entitled
‘Sixteen Lectures in Michaelmas Term 1928–1929 Advanced Theory of Value
e 1929–1930 e Lent 1931’ (hereafter Lectures); as the title indicates, it had
been written by Sraffa for his course of lectures to students undertaking the econ-
omic tripos in the period from 1928 to 1931.1
In the second half of 1927, Sraffa wrote two preparatory notes to the
Lectures; the surviving manuscripts of these notes are now kept in two folders,
Review of Political Economy,
Volume 17, Number 3, 359–380, July 2005
Correspondence Address: Rodolfo Signorino, Dipartimento di Studi su Politica, Diritto e Societa`
G. Mosca, Universita` di Palermo, Piazza Bologni 8, 90134 Palermo, Italy. Email: signorin1969@
libero.it
1Sraffa started teaching at Cambridge in the autumn of 1928, one year after his arrival in England
following an invitation by J. M. Keynes, and suddenly announced his desire to stop teaching in
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catalogued as File D3/12/3 and as File D3/12/4. The first file is a manuscript of
about 70 pages entitled ‘Notes: London/Summer 1927 (Physical real costs etc.)’
(hereafter Notes summer 1927); while the second file is comprised of some
bundles of sheets and some isolated sheets entitled ‘Notes, essentially preparations
for Lectures 1928–1931’ (hereafter Notes November 1927).
Most of the Lectures appear to be an organic text. According to Jonathan
Smith, the archivist of the Wren Library who has supervised the cataloguing of
Sraffa’s manuscripts, ‘the detailed nature of the preparatory material for the
tripos lectures on advanced theory of value read more like papers to be read to
an attentive class—it is a text, not notes’ (Smith, 1998, p. 46). Similarly Heinz
Kurz, in an overview of Sraffa’s unpublished manuscripts, writes that ‘we are in
the possession of a full manuscript containing a detailed account of the contents
of the lectures and for the greater part also fully worked out arguments in
regard to the themes dealt with’ (Kurz, 1998, p. 440).2 By contrast, both Notes
(in particular those of November 1927) appear to be casual memoranda for
personal use.
According to Kurz (1998, p. 438), in the course of his lifetime of research,
Sraffa set himself three tasks: (i) to show that the marginalist theory of value is
not the only available theory of value, (ii) to reconstruct and to develop the clas-
sical theory, a distinct and older theory of value, in order to demonstrate its expla-
natory value, and (iii) to show that the alternative marginalist theory is flawed.
In Sraffa’s published papers of 1925 and 1926, ‘Sulle relazioni fra costo e
quantita` prodotta’ and ‘The laws of returns under competitive conditions’, the
rediscovery and reconstruction of the classical approach to the theory of value
and distribution is only a side-issue. Sraffa examines the supply side of the
Marshallian theory of value in an attempt to ‘separat[e] what is still alive from
what is dead in the concept of the supply curve and of its effects on competitive
price determination’ (Sraffa, 1926, p. 536). By contrast, the history of economic
analysis and its relevance for contemporary economic theorists become a
central focus of inquiry in the Lectures. The latter manuscript clearly exhibits a
distinctive feature of Sraffa’s overall intellectual contribution to economics:
constructive work at an analytical level is always intertwined with constructive
work at a historiographical level. The Lectures constitute a valuable source of
information, up to now unpublished, for all scholars who want to provide a recon-
struction of the early stages of Sraffa’s inquiry into the cognate fields of pure econ-
omic theory and its history. It is not an exaggeration to claim that the Lectures
show that by the late 1920s Sraffa had reached a deep understanding of the philo-
sophical underpinnings, logical structure and theoretical domain of the classical
theory of value. Once he finally got rid of the Marshallian interpretation of classi-
cal economics, Sraffa was able in the Lectures to expose and highlight the many
conceptual differences between the classical theory and the marginalist theory.
Such an understanding at a historiographical level constituted the background
2Professor Pierangelo Garegnani, Sraffa’s literary executor, has entrusted to Professor Heinz D. Kurz
the overall responsibility for the preparation of the forthcoming edition of Sraffa’s unpublished
papers and correspondence.
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condition Sraffa needed to start his constructive work at an analytical level, that is
to say, the formalization of the ‘fundamental propositions’, which 30 years
later would grow into Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities.3
Key concepts in Sraffa’s 1960 interpretation of classical economics, such as the
concepts of surplus or net product, physical real costs and asymmetric treatment
of the distributive variables, are clearly delineated in the Lectures.
The manuscript of the Lectures is long and very complex: Sraffa tackles a
good many intricate problems ranging from the history of economic thought to
pure economic analysis. From p. 61 onwards Sraffa refines the ideas already pre-
sented in ‘Sulle relazioni fra costo e quantita` prodotta’ and only partially summar-
ized to Anglo-Saxon readers in the first part of ‘The laws of returns under
competitive conditions’. A thorough analysis of this material and a comparison
with Sraffa’s 1925–26 statements would require a paper of its own. Similarly, a
separate paper would be needed to analyse in due detail the material placed at
the end of the main manuscript of the Lectures but separated from it. I refer to
some bundles of sheets containing the text of the lectures (particularly on
Pareto’s general equilibrium approach) originally designed by Sraffa for his
course and subsequently excluded from it. In what follows I shall deal only with
the first 60 pages of the Lectures, where Sraffa puts forth some original material
on the history of economic thought and its importance for contemporary students
of the pure theory of value. Moreover, I shall concentrate on one historiographical
theme: Sraffa’s reconstruction of the classical concepts of cost of production and
distribution in comparison with the corresponding marginalist concepts.
To simplify analysis, I shall divide the first 60 pages of the Lectures into two
parts: from p. 1 to the first paragraph of p. 17 and from the second paragraph of
p. 17 to p. 60. The first 17 pages of the Lectures may be interpreted as a sort of
extended methodological preamble in which Sraffa explains why he gives so
much emphasis to themes of history of economic thought within a course of lec-
tures devoted to the advanced theory of value. For Sraffa, the very notion of theory
of value employed by contemporary (Marshallian) economists justifies the wide-
spread indifference towards the history of economics. In particular, the view
adopted by contemporary Marshallian economists on the history of economics
appear to Sraffa to be based on a few assumptions, which may be summarized
by the following propositions.
Proposition 1: the theory of value is a department of economic theory substan-
tially devoid of immediate practical applications.
3In the Preface of Production of Commodities Sraffa recalls that he has elaborated the ‘fundamental
propositions’ of the 1960 book in 1928 and that he has shown them to Keynes. In the folder catalo-
gued as File C239 there is a letter from Pigou to Sraffa dated January 1928. The letter allows us to
infer that Sraffa has shown his ‘fundamental propositions’ not only to Keynes but also to Pigou.
Moreover, it appears that Pigou, like Keynes, was led to think that the theoretical domain of
Sraffa’s equations is restricted to the case of constant costs. Pigou writes: ‘Dear Sraffa, [. . .] your
equations seem to me capable of being subsumed as a special case of the general analysis. You in
effect are simply supposing that each of the three (or n) commodities is being produced under con-
ditions of constant returns. Of course, an elaborate scheme of demand and supply is not needed in
this case: but this case can be treated as a limiting case of the more general theory’.
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Proposition 2: the Marshallian theory of value is the only scientifically correct
theory of value. Thus it may be improved or refined but not radically criticized
or discarded.
Proposition 3: the main, if the not the only, worth of studying the history of
economic thought is the knowledge of how the present theory of value has
gradually evolved from past errors and misconceptions.
Accordingly, Sraffa makes use of the history of economic thought to subject
these propositions to severe criticism. The historical examples selected by Sraffa
are in fact targeted to show that all three propositions are false.
Contra Proposition 1: Sraffa claims that the theory of value is not an intellectual
game; the theory had been originally elaborated and has always been used to
provide general solutions to concrete political and economical problems in
which well-defined class interests are deeply involved.
Contra Proposition 2: Sraffa claims that the Marshallian theory of value is not
the only scientifically correct theory of value. In his view, a careful study of the
history of economic thought reveals that the theoretical domain of the theory of
value gradually changed as economists investigated different quæsita by means
of different analytical tools within different theoretical frameworks.
Contra Proposition 3: Sraffa claims that the duty of historians of economic
thought is not to show how the theory of value has got rid of past errors and
confusions: what Marshallian economists call past errors may instead be true
propositions elaborated within a different approach to the theory of value.
From the second paragraph of p. 17 to p. 60 Sraffa shows that two different
approaches to the theory of value exist, the objectivist approach of the classical
economists and the subjectivist approach of the marginalist economists. Sraffa
selects the concepts of cost of production and distribution as the fields upon
which to measure the theoretical distance which separates the two approaches.
Sraffa starts from William Petty, Franc¸ois Quesnay and the Physiocrats and
arrives at Alfred Marshall by working through Adam Smith (pp. 27–35),
David Ricardo (pp. 36–39), Nassau Senior (pp. 40–41), John Stuart Mill (pp.
42–46) and the Austrian economists (pp. 47–59). Sraffa makes use of examples
taken from the history of economic thought in order to defend the following two
theses:
Thesis 1: the notion of cost of production underwent a drastic semantic shift in
the transition from the classical approach to the marginalist one
Thesis 2: the two different notions of cost of production underlie two different
theories of distribution.
As far as Thesis 1 is concerned, Sraffa describes the classical notion of cost of
production as a magnitude that has a strictly objectivist nature and which can be
observed and directly measured. By contrast, the marginalist notion of cost of
production is, for Sraffa, a strictly subjective magnitude, which cannot be
observed and can be measured only indirectly. His explanation of this fundamental
difference between the classical and marginalist concepts of cost of production is
that they derive from two different views of the nature and goals of economic
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theory. For classical economists, the goal of economics is twofold: (i) to discover
the laws which determine the wealth of nations and its dynamics, and (ii) to
discover the laws which determine income distribution among the various social
classes. The fulfilment of such goals requires an objectivist notion of cost of
production. For marginalist (particularly Marshallian) economists, the goal of
economics is likewise twofold, but different: (i) to discover the laws that
determine the economic behaviour of individual human agents, and (ii) to discover
the laws that determine the equilibrium price of individual commodities. The
fulfilment of such goals requires a subjectivist notion of cost of production.
As far as Thesis 2 is concerned, Sraffa claims that the classical notion of cost
of production leads to an asymmetric theory of distribution in which the distribu-
tive variables are framed into different logical and chronological planes. Wages (in
real terms) are the amounts of commodities that capitalist-entrepreneurs must
advance to workers in order to enable them to undertake and complete the
production process. Profits (in real terms) are the amounts of commodities that
emerge at the end of the production process in the form of surplus or net
product. By contrast, Sraffa argues, the marginalist notion of cost of production
leads to a symmetric theory of distribution in which the distributive variables
are framed into parallel logical and chronological planes. Marshall defines ‘real
cost of production’ as the sum of ‘efforts and sacrifices’ borne by workers, capi-
talist-entrepreneurs and landlords; this definition is the basis for the marginalist
view that the ‘monetary expenses of production’ constitute the sum of pecuniary
incentives in terms of wages, profits and rents necessary to induce workers,
capitalist-entrepreneurs and landlords to bear the loss of utility connected to the
production activity. The chronological symmetry between wages, profits and
rents reflects a symmetry in the distribution of property rights between workers,
capitalist-entrepreneurs and landlords: wages, profits and rents are simply coordi-
nate shares in the final product.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 brings together and
discusses Sraffa’s sparse hints on the classical theory of value and distribution
in the published papers of the mid-1920s in comparison with his related statements
in the Notes and the Lectures. In Section 3 the first 17 pages of the Lectures are
scrutinized in order to reconstruct Sraffa’s views on the nature and the role of
the history of economic thought. Sections 4 and 5 deal respectively with
Sraffa’s twin comparisons—his comparison of the classical and marginalist
notions of cost of production, and his comparison of the classical and the margin-
alist theories of distribution. Section 6 concludes.
2. From the 1925 and 1926 Papers to the Notes and the Lectures
In the Italian paper of 1925 and in the first part of the Economic Journal paper of
the following year, Sraffa focuses on the critique of the received Marshallian
theory of value, based on the ceteris paribus clause (see Signorino 2000a,
2000b, 2001a). The rediscovery of the distinctive features of the classical
theory of value and distribution appears to be an important side-issue, but
still a side-issue. Moreover, at this time Sraffa still adhered to the Marshallian
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historiography, according to which the classical theory of value is based on the
tacit assumption of constant costs (see Roncaglia, 1991, p. 378):4
The idea of interdependence between quantity produced and the cost of
production of a commodity produced under competitive conditions is not
suggested by experience at all and could not arise spontaneously. It can be
said that all classical writers accept implicitly, as an obvious fact, that cost
is independent of quantity, and they do not bother to discuss the contrary
hypothesis. (Sraffa, 1925, p. 279 [1998, p. 325]; emphasis added)
Nonetheless, if one delves into Sraffa’s 1925 argument one may uncover
signs of his awareness that classical economics and marginalist economics are
not identical theoretical entities. Sraffa’s 1925 paper reveals that differences are
manifold and concern
(i) the foundations of the two theories,
(ii) the quaesita each theory is designed to answer,
(iii) the logical structure of the two theories,
(iv) their theoretical domain.
As far as differences on point (i) are concerned, Sraffa points out that the fall into
oblivion of classical economics and the rise to dominance of marginalist econ-
omics implies a ‘change in the basis of the theory of value, from cost of production
to utility’ (Sraffa, 1925, p. 279 [1998, p. 325]). In the 1925 paper, Sraffa does not
thoroughly analyse the classical notion of cost of production and the conceptual
differences between the classical and the marginalist notions of cost of production.
By contrast, as is shown infra in Section 4, Sraffa devotes much space to this point
in the Notes and in the Lectures.
As far as differences about point (ii) are concerned, Sraffa maintains that
classical economics and marginalist economics are designed to solve two very
different theoretical problems. Classical economics, particularly Ricardian
economics, aims to elucidate the laws which determine the distribution of the
social product among the various social classes and the historical dynamics of
the distributive variables. By contrast, marginalist economics aims to elucidate
the laws which determine the prices of individual commodities (see Sraffa,
1925, p. 319 [1998, p. 356]). In the Notes and in the Lectures Sraffa gives much
emphasis to this point, which is simply hinted at in the 1925 paper (see infra
Section 3).
Regarding the differences on point (iii), Sraffa states that classical authors
employ the law of diminishing returns within the field of distribution and
the laws of increasing returns within the field of production. He adds that
4As is well-known, Sraffa himself, in the Preface of Production of Commodities, acknowledges that
he had adhered to the Marshallian constant-cost interpretation of classical economics in the Italian
paper of 1925: ‘The temptation to presuppose constant returns is not entirely fanciful. It was experi-
enced by the author himself when he started on these studies many years ago—and led him in 1925
into an attempt to argue that only the case of constant returns was generally consistent with the
premises of economic theory’ (Sraffa, 1960, p. vi).
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‘nobody, until comparatively recently, had thought of unifying these two
tendencies in one single law of non-proportional productivity, and considering
this as one of the bases of the theory of price’ (Sraffa, 1925, p. 279 [1998,
p. 324]). Accordingly, for Sraffa the classical theory of value, contrary to the
Marshallian theory of value, requires neither ‘a co-ordination of the different
tendencies under one single “law of non-proportional costs” ’, nor the construction
of a supply curve such as to be ‘symmetrical to the corresponding demand curve
for each commodity’ (Sraffa, 1925, p. 319 [1998, p. 356]). In the Lectures (from
p. 61 onwards) Sraffa restates and elaborates upon the same line of thought.
Finally, as far as differences about point (iv) are concerned, Sraffa stresses
that Ricardo uses the word ‘corn’ to indicate the whole of agricultural production.
By contrast, Marshallian economists use the word ‘corn’ to indicate one single
agricultural commodity among many others. Sraffa (1925, p. 324, fn 1 [1998,
p. 360, fn 81]) quotes a passage from Marshall’s (1920) Principles of Economics
to clarify that Marshall himself was aware of the peculiar meaning of the word
‘corn’ within the classical theory of value:
the term corn was used by [the English classical economists] as short for
agricultural produce in general, somewhat as Petty (Taxes and Contributions,
Ch. XIV) speaks of ‘the Husbandry of Corn, which we will suppose to
contain all necessaries of life as in the Lord’s Prayer we suppose the word
Bread doth’. (Marshall, 1920, p. 509, note 2)5
In Sraffa’s (1925) view, the different semantics of the word ‘corn’ within
classical and marginalist economics stems logically from the fact that the classical
economists, contrary to Marshallian economists, adopt an aggregate point of
view.6 This second distinction about different points of view is of crucial import-
ance for a correct understanding of Sraffa’s overall 1925 stance on the debate
concerning empty economic boxes and their role within the pure theory of
value. As noted by Clapham (1922), applied economists’ effort to classify real-
world industries into the three Marshallian boxes labelled increasing, constant
and diminishing returns proved totally unsuccessful. Sraffa argues that such
failure does not derive from ‘objective circumstances inherent in the various
industries’ but ‘is dependent on the point of view of the person acting as observer’
(Sraffa, 1925, p. 278 [1998, p. 324]). Both in ‘Sulle relazioni fra costo e quantita`
prodotta’ and in the Lectures, Sraffa stresses that the law of diminishing returns
holds in the presence of a factor (typically land) whose total amount cannot be
diminished or augmented. Such an assumption concerning land is a natural one
5The same message appears also in the Lectures: ‘It is true that Ricardo usually speaks only of the
production of corn in connection with diminishing returns: but no doubt he uses the term “corn”
for agricultural produce in general, as Sir W. Petty, in an often quoted passage, speaks of “the
Husbandry of Corn, which we will suppose to contain all the necessaries of life, as in the Lord’s
Prayer we suppose the word Bread does” ’ (D2/4, pp. 68–69).
6As stressed by Sraffa, Pigou acknowledges that Marshallian analysis ‘is not designed for application
to the output of a whole body of a country’s resources lumped together into a single industry’. The
theoretical domain of Marshallian analysis is for Pigou to be limited to the conditions of production
of a single commodity, which ‘is supposed to make use of only a small part of the aggregate
resources of the country’ (Sraffa, 1925, p. 320 [1998, p. 356]).
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in the classical theory, but it is inadmissible in the marginalist theory: land can
legitimately be considered as a factor that cannot be diminished or augmented
only from the point of view of the class of agricultural entrepreneurs considered
as a whole. In contrast, the individual agricultural entrepreneurs considered by
marginalist economists may vary at their will the amount of land employed just
as they can vary the amount employed of any other factor of production, provided
that they pay the corresponding factor price (see Sraffa, 1925, pp. 286, 301 [1998,
pp. 330, 342]; and D2/4, pp. 55, 85).
Sraffa emphasizes the differences in the theoretical domains of classical and
marginalist theory mainly in the Notes summer 1927. Here Sraffa explicitly writes
that there are two radically different theories of value: the first theory includes in
its theoretical domain the overall amount of the commodities produced by a given
economy and synthesized by the word ‘corn’; the second theory includes in its
theoretical domain a single commodity taken in isolation from all the others
(see D3/12/3, p. 4). According to Sraffa, Marshall did not fully understand all
the theoretical consequences deriving from the differences in the theoretical
domains of the two theories of value. As a result of this misunderstanding,
Marshall tried to pour the old wine of the classical laws of returns into the new
barrels of his symmetrical theory of value, based on the ceteris paribus clause.
Marshall’s attempt, according to Sraffa, has caused ‘a good deal of confusion’
which only a careful study of the history of economic thought can make clear:
The distinction between these two concepts of the range of the theory of value
should be clearly kept in mind. A good deal of confusion usually is caused
through the using of materials originally framed for the purposes of the wider
theory by classical economists in connection with the narrower one.
An obvious example—so obvious that it can hardly give place to misunder-
standing—is the use of the word ‘corn’ by the English classical economists.
[. . .] One has therefore to be very careful in applying Ricardo’s statement
about the value of ‘corn’ to problems in which it is relevant to understand
corn as one of many commodities, as opposed to its meaning as a synthesis of
all commodities. (An error in this way has been committed with the law of
dim[inishing] returns as we shall see). [. . .] It should be incidentally remarked
that corn, just for the reasons that it was particularly appropriate to represent
all commodities in the classical theory of value, is highly unsuitable to be
taken as an example in the restricted theory. Its production absorbs such a
large share of the land of the world and labour, its consumption represents
such a large share in the consumption of the majority of the population, that
the condition cœteris paribus hardly represents the real circumstances in its
production. (D3/12/3, pp. 12–13, 15)
The fruits of Sraffa’s inquiry into the field of the historical development of
the theory of value ripened in the late 1920s, in the Notes and in the Lectures.
In the latter work Sraffa finally jettisons the Marshallian interpretation of the
classical theory of value as based on the implicit assumption of constant returns
to scale. In the Lectures, in fact, Sraffa denies that the theoretical domain of the
classical theory of value is inevitably restricted to the case of constant costs:
The interdependence of cost and quantity produced is quite a modern idea. All
the classical economists ignore it altogether so much so that it cannot even be
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said that they assume constant costs to operate throughout as their argument
implies, since they don’t take the question into consideration at all; and their
discussions of what are the causes of value refer only to whether it is only the
quantity of labour, or also profit, or also rent: but they are all agreed in
looking for the causes only on the side of supply. (D2/4, p. 66)
The above passage from the Lectures may be considered a turning point in
Sraffa’s understanding of classical economics, both from a historiographical and
an analytical point of view, whose importance may hardly be overrated. Exactly
the same interpretation of the classical point of view endorsed in the Lectures
is, in fact, restated in the Preface of Production of Commodities, where, as is
well-known, Sraffa (1960, p. v) claims that ‘no question arises as to the variation
or constancy of returns’ in the first two parts of his 1960 book or in classical econ-
omics thanks to the method based on the assumption of given quantities (on the
assumption of given quantities see Kurz & Salvadori, 1998, and Roncaglia,
2000, Chapter 2).
3. The First 17 Pages of the Lectures
The first 17 pages of the Lectures have a marked methodological character. Sraffa
makes extensive use of examples taken from the history of economic thought to
criticize the received (Marshallian) view on the nature and the role of the
theory of value and its history. Sraffa claims that Marshallian economists consider
the theory of value as a purely abstract intellectual construction whose main target
is to provide a general explanation of the equilibrium value of single commodities
produced under the most varied conditions. Interpreted from such a standpoint,
Sraffa goes on, the theory of value must necessarily start from a limited number
of assumptions of a wholly general character:
The general theory of value being intended to take into account the common
characteristics of the most diverse conditions under which the values of different
commodities are determined, it is necessarily very abstract in character. It moves
from a relatively small number of assumptions and deduces from them the way
through which an equilibrium is reached. (D2/4, p. 1)
Consequently, the propositions and categories (such as Clapham’s boxes)
elaborated by the value theorists are not a fit subject for an empirical critique
a` la Clapham (1922). A critical evaluation of the empirical content pertains
only to the assumptions and not to the conclusions of the theory of value. The
latter may be scrutinized only from the point of view of their logical relationship
with the assumptions of the theory:
It might therefore appear at first sight that the theory [of value] is a purely logical
construction and that the attitude to take towards it in order to understand its
implications is simply first to find out to what extent its assumptions correspond
to the facts, since the conclusions will be to some extent representative, and then
to follow the logical process of deduction. (D2/4, p. 1)
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A further consequence of this train of thought for Sraffa is the irrelevance
of a knowledge of the history of economic thought for contemporary economic
theorists:
If that were so, then a knowledge of the history of the doctrine would have an
importance for its own sake, but it would not be required for the understanding
of the theory as it stands. The history would be simply the record of a series of
mistakes which have been successively corrected. (ibidem)
Sraffa thoroughly disagrees with this point of view on the nature and role of
the theory of value and its history. On the very first page of his 1926 Economic
Journal paper, Sraffa reports J. M. Keynes’s (and Marshall’s) view of the
theory of value, expounded in the Introduction to the Cambridge Economic Hand-
books, according to which ‘the theory of economics does not furnish a body of
settled conclusions immediately applicable to policy. It is a method rather than
a doctrine, an apparatus of the mind, a technique of thinking, which helps its
possessor to draw correct conclusions’ (Keynes 1971–89, Vol. XII, p. 856,
quoted by Sraffa, 1926, p. 535; emphasis added). For Sraffa, such a view deeply
influences the direction of contemporary academic research on the theory of
value insofar as it turns it into ‘a theory in respect to which it is not worth
while departing from a tradition which is finally accepted’ (Sraffa, 1926, p. 536).
In the Lectures, Sraffa substantiates his 1926 indictment of the Marshall-
Keynes’ view on the theory of value by means of a threefold argument.
First Argument
The Marshallian view hides from sight the politico-ideological element underlying
the genesis of any economic theory. According to Sraffa, economic theories arise
from the attempt to find a general solution to concrete policy questions. Each
economic theory advocates a well-defined solution to the policy questions under
discussion in a given time and place. Each proposed solution has a direct
bearing upon the rival economic interests at stake:
economic theories, whether ancient or modern, do not arise out of the simple
intellectual curiosity of finding out the reasons for what is observed to happen
in the factory or in the market place. They arise out of practical problems
which present themselves to the community and which must be solved. There
are opposite interests which support either one solution or the other and they
find theoretical, that is universal, arguments in order to prove that the solution
they advocate is conformable to natural laws, or to the public interest, or to
the interest of the ruling class or to whatever is the ideology which at the
particular moment is dominating. (D2/4, p. 2)
Second Argument
The Marshallian view implies that economists have always investigated basically
the same questions by means of basically the same analytical tools within basically
the same theoretical framework. In short, it implies that economics is a monopar-
adigmatic discipline. Sraffa holds that this implication is false. In the course of
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time the theoretical domain of the theory of value has gradually changed since
economists have pursued different quæsita by means of different analytical tools.
(The analytical differences have been overshadowed by the fact that economists
have used the same name for different concepts—for example, the notion of
‘cost of production’ in the classical theory and the very different notion of ‘cost
of production’ in the marginalist theory.) Therefore, the very notion of theory of
value turns out to be conceptually ambiguous insofar as it includes different
theoretical frameworks within its boundaries.7 The conclusion to draw, for
Sraffa, is that, contrary to the Marshallian view, a knowledge of the history of
economic thought is relevant for contemporary economic theorists. Only a
careful study of the history of economic thought can overcome the conceptual
ambiguity of the expression ‘theory of value’:
In order to understand the modern theory of value it is necessary to have some
knowledge of its history. This in the sense that the history is not only necessary
in order to understand the origin of the theory, which is obvious; but it is
also necessary in order to understand its significance, that is, the nature of the
problems which it proposes to solve. (D2/4, p. 1)
Third Argument
The Marshallian view, by making economics a monoparadigmatic discipline, has
the further implication that the only correct way to write the history of the theory
of value is to treat it as a linear development from past error to present truth:8
some who have taken this way have definitively stated that the history of econ-
omic doctrines should only be a history of true doctrines, that is, it should show
how successive truths have been gradually discovered, thus building up by
gradual steps the present theory; what is the good of reviewing all the blunders
which have been made by economists in the past? Of course, this point of view
implies an absolute belief in the finality of present doctrines. (D2/4, p. 2)
7The reconstruction of the different meanings, which in the course of time economists have attached
to the expression ‘theory of value’, is a theme to which Sraffa devotes much space also in the Notes
summer 1927. Sraffa writes: ‘The very concept of the “theory of value” has undergone a deep trans-
formation according to the problem which most intensely attracted in each period the interest of
economists. Accordingly, widely different things are covered by the same expression. We may
for the purpose in hand distinguish three conceptions corresponding to three well-defined periods:
I. Causes and Nature of Wealth (1776–1820), II. Distribution of product amongst classes (1820-
1870), III. Determination of price of single commodities. [. . .] The practical problem held in view
by the first is “how to increase the national wealth”, by the second “how to change its distribution
or how to justify the present distribution”, by the third “how to explain and how to foresee a change
in the price of an article”’ (D3/12/3, p. 9). A few pages later, Sraffa goes so far as to propose that the
two main theories of value, the classical and the marginalist one, should be indicated by means of
two different names in order to avoid the confusion stemming from the fact that the very same
name ‘theory of value’ indicates different theoretical objects (see D3/12/3, p. 16).
8On Marshallian historiography and its linear development thesis see Groenewegen (1991). Accord-
ing to Kuhn (1970), it is typical of scientists actively working within the boundaries of a ruling para-
digm to defend the linear development thesis in the historical chapter of their handbooks.
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Needless to add, Sraffa is not persuaded of the ‘finality of present [Marshallian]
doctrines’. That is the main reason why in the opening part of the Lectures he
elaborates a historical picture of economics as a poliparadigmatic discipline,
characterized by two radically different approaches to the theory of value and
distribution, and as a discipline whose dynamics are mainly driven by exogenous
material factors, such as changes in the conditions of production, and not by
endogenous intellectual factors, such as scholars’ curiosity.9
The history of economics as reconstructed by Sraffa is a history of how the
various economic theories have been forged within debates concerning questions
of economic policy, and of how they have been employed to support the economic
interests of one class against another. The discovery of truly and permanent scien-
tific results appears to Sraffa to be a sort of (often unintentional) joint-product
emerging from economists’ research activity. A few examples concerning this
aspect of Sraffa’s historiography must suffice. Smith’s glorification of the doctrine
of natural liberty as an engine of economic growth is to be framed, according to
Sraffa, in the context of the rise to dominance of the manufacturing classes,
who were intolerant of the mercantilist doctrine of State intervention:
the substance of [Smith’s] work and the very effort he makes to emphasise the
existence of natural laws in economics must be understood essentially as a way
of fighting against mercantilism and every form of interference with the freedom
of trade. That the necessities of his polemics against mercantilism led him to the
formulation of general laws, and that this result has a permanent scientific
value, may be regarded almost as a by-product of the way in which he advocated
a practical policy. (D2/4, pp. 4–5; emphasis added)
In the same vein, Sraffa claims that the Ricardian theory of value is to be
judged from the standpoint of the Corn Law debate, in which the economic inter-
ests of the landlords, opponents of the free-trade doctrine, were counterposed to
those of the urban entrepreneurs, supporters of the free-trade doctrine. According
to Sraffa, Ricardo pursues basically a political purpose (to demonstrate that rent
does not enter into cost of production and is therefore taxable), not a theoretical
purpose (to elaborate a logically watertight theory of value):
[Ricardo] was a business-man and spent most of his life in the Stock Exchange.
His interest in political economy originated in the political controversies of his
day in which he took part, and for many years his contributions to economics
were pamphlets of a practical character. Only in the later years of his life did
he take an interest in theory for his own sake and wrote his Principles of Politi-
cal Economy. His theoretical work, notwithstanding its abstract appearance, is
deeply influenced by his practical interests. [. . .] Ricardo’s main interest . . . was
not so much distribution in general between all those who take a part in it as
9To take just one example, Sraffa explains the rejection of the classical concept of the wage-fund by
contemporary economic theorists by remarking that the wage-fund theory was supported when
England was an agricultural economy and was discarded when England became a manufacturing
economy. In this regard Sraffa writes: ‘This is a typical example of what seems to be a very
general fact: that is to say, that the change in economic doctrines is more often due to changes in
the conditions of production than to the discovery of new truth’ (D2/4, p. 34).
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distribution between the landlord on one side and all the others on the other. [. . .]
The essential thing for Ricardo’s practical purposes was to prove that rent does
not enter into the cost of production of that final part of the product which regu-
lates value. For this purpose it was indifferent whether cost of production
included only labour or also the use of capital; and this explains the carelessness
of Ricardo in stating his position in this respect. (D2/4, pp. 5 ff; emphasis added)
If, in Ricardo’s day, the main social conflict was between landlords and urban
entrepreneurs, Sraffa goes on, a few years after Ricardo’s death the opposing
classes were capitalists and workers. Socio-economic conditions having
changed, Ricardo’s economics becomes a dreadful tool of propaganda for the
rising socialist movement:
In a conflict between landlords and manufacturers, particularly when this word
is meant to include both employers and workers, [Ricardo’s theory of labour-
value] works in the interest of the manufacturers. But in a conflict between
labour and capital it obviously becomes a strong argument in favour of
labour. (D2/4, p. 11)
According to Sraffa, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the ruling
class sought a different theory of value, one endowed with less revolutionary
political implications than Ricardo’s. Hence the ruling class enthusiastically
welcomed the apparently new theory of diminishing marginal utility, put forth
by Jevons, Menger and Walras. The novelty of the theory of marginal utility is
only apparent, Sraffa notes, since the very same theory had been proposed by
Cournot, Dupuit and Gossen in the first part of the nineteenth century and had
been largely ignored. Hence, for Sraffa, the success of the marginalist theory in
the last three decades of the nineteenth century is mainly due to political and
not to purely scientific reasons.10 The contrast between the complete failure met
by earlier theorists of marginal utility and the ready and widespread acceptance
found by that very theory in the 1870s:
cannot be explained by the stupidity of the people in 1850, when they rejected
the theory advanced by Gossen, and their intelligence in 1870 when they
accepted the same theory as stated by Jevons. I rather prefer to accept prof.
Fetter’s and Sir W. Ashley’s view, that there is a close relation between
the emerging of Marxism and the extraordinarily ready acceptance which the
theory of marginal utility [gained] amongst orthodox economists. And that
10In the same vein, in the Notes summer 1927, Sraffa writes: ‘The labour theory of value was devised
by Ricardo as a stick to beat landlords (rent does not enter into cost of production). But later, having
been advocated by Marx to beat the capitalists, it was necessary for the defenders of the present
system to devise a new theory, the utility theory of value’ (D3/12/3, pp. 10–11). Sraffa remarks
that the law of diminishing returns had a similar destiny. This law has been neglected at the
moment it was first discovered, but was subsequently rediscovered and generally accepted.
Sraffa’s explanation of such ups and downs is that the law was rediscovered when it was found
useful in the political debates of the time: ‘Another curious example of this phenomenon to
which we shall come across is that of the law of diminishing returns: having been discovered by
Turgot, and again by Anderson, it was simultaneously rediscovered by West, Malthus and
Ricardo when it was wanted for practical purposes (when it was found suitable for an advocated
solution of the problems of the day) and generally recognized and accepted’ (D3/12/3, p. 12).
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conservative minded people were only too glad to seize an opportunity of getting
rid of the labour theory of value, notwithstanding the enormous authority it
derived from the tradition of the classical economists. (D2/4, pp. 15–17)
Sraffa’s historiographical thesis has an important corollary: if no purely
scientific reason has sentenced the classical theory of value and distribution to
oblivion, then there is no purely scientific impediment to the attempt to rescue
the classical theory of value and distribution from oblivion and to develop its
still unexplored analytical potentialities. Given Sraffa’s belief in the truth of the
main premise, the cogency of this corollary may be said to have oriented
Sraffa’s entire research since the 1930s.
4. The Classical versus the Marginalist Notion of Cost of Production
Starting from the second paragraph of p. 17 of the Lectures, Sraffa carries out a
detailed analysis of the evolution of the concept of cost of production in the
course of the history of economic thought.11 He reconstructs the classical
notion of cost of production as a magnitude which (i) is strictly objectivist, and
(ii) is observable and directly measurable. Sraffa identifies Petty, Quesnay and
the Physiocrats as the classical economists who have most rigorously adhered to
this notion of cost of production. In Sraffa’s view, these economists elaborated
a concept of cost of production fully equivalent to that of physical amount of econ-
omic resources destroyed in the course of production. Labour is an element of cost
insofar as a given amount of subsistence goods must be advanced to workers to
allow them to perform their productive activity. Hence, Sraffa concludes, within
the theoretical world of Petty and Quesnay, any phenomena related to workers’
psychical sphere is wholly irrelevant to costs accounting:
For Petty and the Physiocrats cost [. . .] is a stock of material that is required for
the production of a commodity; this material being of course mainly food for the
workers. But Petty wants to make it quite clear that his notion of cost has nothing
to do with the pleasant or unpleasant feelings of men, and he defines ‘the
common measure of value’ as ‘the day’s food of an adult Man, at a Medium,
and not the day’s labour’. This cost is therefore something concrete, tangible,
and visible, that can be measured in tons or gallons. (D2/4, p. 21; the first
and third emphases are mine, the second is Sraffa’s)
11The reconstruction of the different meanings of the expression ‘cost of production’ in the objecti-
vist approach of the classical economists and in the subjectivist approach of the marginalist econom-
ists is a theme to which Sraffa devotes an entire bundle of sheets entitled ‘Degeneration of cost and
value’ in the Notes November 1927. Sraffa writes: ‘A. Smithþ RicardoþMarx indeed began to
corrupt the idea of cost—from food to labour. But their notion was still near enough to be in
many cases equivalent. The decomposition went on at a terrific speed from 1820 to 1870:
Senior’s abstinence and Mill’s mess of the whole thing, Cairnes brought it to the final stage “sacri-
fice” [. . .] Simultaneously a much bigger step was taken in the process of shifting the basis of value
from physical to psychical processes: Jevons, Menger, Walras. [. . .] It was only Pettyþ the Physio-
crats who had the right notion of cost as “loaf of bread”. Then somebody started measuring it in
labour, as everyday’s labour requires the same amount of food. Then they proceeded to regard
cost as actually an amount of labour. Then A. Smith interpreted labour as the “the toil and
trouble” which is the “real cost” and the “hardship”. . . .’
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At the end of a given production cycle, the excess of final product over the
amount of commodities which must be put aside to allow a new production
cycle to begin constitutes the surplus (‘produit net’ or net product) generated by
the economic system. For Sraffa, the concept of surplus, as much as the objective
and directly measurable notion of cost of production, turns out be the distinguishing
and permanent contribution of Petty and the Physiocrats to classical economics:
The whole system of the Physiocrats turns upon the conception of cost which I
have outlined. The essential question for them is the ‘produit net’ or net produce,
that is the difference between the total aggregate of goods advanced and
consumed in production and the aggregate of goods produced. [. . .] This idea
of the ‘net produce’ or surplus product, regarded as a difference between an
amount of goods advanced (consumed) in production and the larger amount
of goods produced is the cornerstone of the Physiocratic system. But while
their view that only agriculture produces a net surplus [. . .] was soon discarded,
the notion of the surplus product plays an important part in classical economics.
(D2/4, pp. 25, 27)
The first breach of the objective and directly measurable notion of cost of pro-
duction were carried out by Adam Smith. Sraffa stresses that the Wealth of Nations
contains some conceptual ambiguities regarding the notion of cost of production.
There are some elements that clearly derive from the Petty-Quesnay tradition;
but there are also other elements that are alien to that theoretical tradition. These
latter elements, subsequently developed by J. B. Say in France and W. N. Senior
in England, among others, are what, for Sraffa, paved the way to the radically differ-
ent notion of cost of production proposed by marginalist economists in the second
half of the nineteenth century. In particular, Sraffa refers to the connection Smith
draws between cost of production and the ‘toil and trouble’ caused to workers by
their labour activity. Smith’s connection of these two ideas is for Sraffa the Trojan
Horse through which phenomena related to the psychological sphere of individual
agents involved in production take their first steps into mainstream economic analysis,
and Marshall’s praise of this aspect of Smith’s thought supports Sraffa’s view:12
12In the Lectures Sraffa restricts himself to highlighting Smith’s conceptual ambiguities without
expressing a definite historiographical judgment on the role played by Smith in the development
of the theory of value, particularly as a ‘corruptor’ of the Petty-Quesnay approach. By contrast, in
a sheet entitled ‘History’ kept within the Notes November 1927 Sraffa explicitly claims: ‘A.
Smith had strong “vulgar” tendencies: he can truly be said to be the “founder of modern econ-
omics” ’. Moreover, Sraffa describes the situation of the theory of value in the years that elapsed
between Ricardo’s death and the rise to dominance of marginalist economics in the following
terms: ‘Period dominated by [John Stuart] Mill: Marx stands here towering as the last of the classi-
cals amongst the vulgars, just as Smith stood isolated among the classicals, being the first of the
vulgars’. The content of Sraffa’s judgement on Smith as well as Sraffa’s terminology, suggest
that Sraffa’s view on the history of economic thought at the time of the Lectures is somewhat influ-
enced by Marx’s reading. It is not possible in this paper to analyse in due detail the relationship
between Marx’s historiography and Sraffa’s historiography in the late 1920s. Here it is possible
to mention a brief paragraph written by Sraffa in a block-notes kept in the folder catalogued as
File D3/12/11 and dated November 1927 where Sraffa mentions Marx’s Histoire des Doctrines
Economique and emphasizes the role played by the history of economic analysis in the making of
Marx’s economic analysis.
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A. Smith adopted this notion of surplus, and with it the idea of cost of the
Physiocrats. But he has also a different idea of cost—and it is in a sense true
that the Wealth of N[ations] as a whole represents the connecting link between
the eighteen[th] century economics and the modern one. Thus he conceives of
labour as an amount of “toil and trouble”: although he uses this expression
only incidentally, Marshall has thought it so important and significant as to
say that ‘the point of view . . . from which a commodity is regarded as the
embodiment of measurable efforts and sacrifices was conquered for us by
A. Smith’. (D2/4, p. 27)
With David Ricardo the concept of cost of production turns back into the
objectivist riverbed of Petty and Quesnay. Sraffa acknowledges that Ricardo, as
much as Smith, focuses on human labour, leaving the other elements of cost of
production somewhat in the background. Nonetheless, Sraffa underscores that
the Ricardian notion of human labour is totally free from the subjectivist overtones
present in Smith’s notion and thus it perfectly fulfils the two requirements of the
Petty-Quesnay approach. The Ricardian notion of human labour, as reconstructed
by Sraffa, is strictly objectivist:
[Ricardo] reduces cost to a single element, labour, with some doubts as to
whether to include the services of capital in addition to the labour that has
produced the capital goods—and [. . .] definitively excludes rent from cost. I
do not propose to deal at this stage with Ricardo’s notion of cost, and particu-
larly with the significance of his exclusion of rent from it. [. . .] At present I
am only tracing the transformation of the notion of cost from the original one
of a stock of material goods, to the conception of an amount of human sacri-
fice—that is to say the gradual transition from an objective to a subjective
point of view. It is only this aspect of Ricardo’s theory that we are considering.
Now for Ricardo, all considerations about the pleasantness or unpleasantness of
labour are irrelevant to this question. Workers are paid in exact proportion to
what is required to keep them alive and efficient, and thus to enable them to
produce: the amount of wages necessary for this object is completely indepen-
dent of the different sacrifices made by workers in different trades. Of course in
trades in which greater efforts are expected higher wages will be paid, but this
only to the extent that the greater effort requires a greater amount of food in
order to be accomplished. (D2/4, pp. 36–37; emphasis added)
Sraffa locates at the opposite end of the theoretical spectrum the notion
of cost of production elaborated by marginalist economists in the second half of
the nineteenth century. For Sraffa, the marginalist notion of cost of production
is a magnitude which (i) has a strictly subjective nature, and (ii) is neither obser-
vable nor directly measurable. Sraffa identifies Marshall and the Austrian econom-
ists as the most rigorous exponents of the subjectivist notion of cost of production.
Sraffa’s Marshall makes cost of production semantically equivalent to the notion
of disutility or negative utility insofar as Marshall defines ‘real cost of production’
as the overall amount of ‘effort and sacrifices’ which individual human agents
incur because of their decision to employ their own resources in production.
Thus, contrary to the classical notion of cost of production, the Marshallian
notion of cost of production concerns phenomena that take place within the
psychological sphere of individual agents. As such, it turns out to be a magnitude
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which can’t be directly observed and can be measured only indirectly by means of
the monetary rule:13
Marshall regards the ‘real cost of production’ of a commodity as the sum of
‘efforts and sacrifices’ involved in the abstinences or waitings and in the
labour of all kinds that is directly or indirectly required for the production of
a commodity. Real cost therefore is an aggregate of the unpleasant feelings of
various sorts felt by the individuals connected with production. [. . .] [Cost in
the sense of Marshall] is absolutely private to each individual, and can only
be measured (if at all) by means of the monetary inducement required to call
forth the exertion. (D2/4, pp. 20–21)
With the Austrian economists the notion of cost of production becomes
semantically equivalent to the notion of opportunity cost. Since the same factor
of production (or good of lower order in Austrian terminology) may be
used in the production of different consumption goods (or goods of first order, say
x and y), the production of x implies that a given amount of factors of production
cannot be used to produce y. The loss of utility deriving from the fact that the y is
not actually produced is, for Sraffa, the Austrian notion of cost of production of x:
Labour is nothing but one of these goods of lower order, as any of the materials
used in production: [. . .] It enters into cost according to the Austrians not as an
effort or a sacrifice, but in the shape of the utility lost owing to its not being
available in other uses when it is applied to a particular production. Thus, the
Austrians very nearly identify themselves with the theory of opportunity cost,
which regards all costs, and not only labour, as made up of the utilities lost in
the alternative employments which would have been available for it. (D2/4,
pp. 48–49)
As remarked in Section 3 above, Sraffa holds that, over time, economists
have elaborated different theoretical frameworks to investigate different quæsita
by means of different analytical tools. Such a historiographical thesis leads
Sraffa to claim that different value theorists have elaborated different notions of
cost of production as a tool to tackle different problems. Hence, each notion of
cost of production must be appraised in terms of its congruence with the specific
questions addressed by each theory of value:
In taking such opposite views [on cost] Petty and Marshall are quite consistent
with their general conceptions about the method of economics and the nature of
its subject matter. [. . .] I should like to notice that between these two notions of
real cost it is not necessarily so much a question of one of them being right and
13The status of being observable and directly measurable for the magnitudes put at the heart of the
theory of value is a theme to which Sraffa devotes much attention also in the Notes summer 1927.
Sraffa writes: ‘a method of measurement, even if inapplicable in practice, has a very great theoretical
importance even if rough and approximate as the money test; in fact it helps us to conceive, we could
not otherwise. Particularly so in the case of utility: we have no direct way of apprehending it, of
learning its existence: we have got its notion from an obsolete hedonistic psychology, and—on
the collapse of the latter—we have simply kept it standing as an explanatory hypothesis, the expla-
nation of demand price’ (D3/12/3, p. 61). For more on this point, see Signorino (2001b).
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the other wrong, as of one being relevant for dealing with one set of questions,
and the other for an entirely different sort of questions. (D2/4, pp. 21, 24–25)
For Sraffa, classical economics has the specific aim of detecting the laws that
determine the wealth of nations and its dynamics and the laws that determine the
distribution of the wealth of nations among the various social classes. The attain-
ment of these aims requires that the surplus generated by the economy can be
determined in an unambiguous way. This in turn justifies the classical notion of
cost of production as the amount of physical resources employed in production:
For Quesnay, and the earlier Physiocrats, the idea of cost is not necessarily
linked up with that of price or value; the cost is for him an element of the pro-
ductive process, which must be exactly measured in order to compare it with the
product and thus determine whether the product contains a surplus over and
above cost. (D2/4, p. 25)
Similarly, Marshallian economics has the specific aim of detecting the laws
that determine the economic behaviour of individual human agents and the laws
that determine the equilibrium price of individual commodities. The attainment
of these aims requires a method for measuring, in an unambiguous way, individual
sensations and their balancing at the margin: ‘The whole of Economics is regarded
by M[arshall] as a method for measuring the motives of individuals and for balan-
cing exactly utilities with disutilities, that is to say, pleasures and sacrifices’ (D2/4,
p. 22). This in turn justifies the Marshallian notion of cost of production as the sum
of unpleasant feelings experienced by the individual human agents involved in
production: ‘It is only when cost is conceived as a quantity of disutility, that is
to say of negative utility, that it can be brought together with marginal utility in
a single theory of value’ (D2/4, p. 18).
5. The Classical versus the Marginalist Theory of Distribution
Sraffa’s meticulous work of clarification, in the first part of the Lectures, of the
conceptual differences existing between the classical and the marginalist
notions of cost of production is not a mere scholarly exercise. As stressed in
Section 3 above, for Sraffa the genesis of any economic theory is to be traced
into specific class interests. That may be why Sraffa emphasizes that the different
notions of cost of production employed by classical and marginalist economists
entail different views on the subject of income distribution, and why he claims
that the different conceptions of income distribution are ‘the most important con-
sequence of these opposite views of cost’ (D2/4, p. 22).14
14The analysis of the different theories of distribution elaborated by classical and marginalist econ-
omists is not to be considered a detour from Sraffa’s main line of argument on the theory of value. On
the contrary, such an analysis is strictly tied to the aim of clarifying the conceptual differences exist-
ing between the classical and the marginalist theories of value. According to Sraffa, in fact, ‘in the
background of every theory of value there is a theory of distribution. The real problem to be solved
by a theory of value, that is: “Why is a commodity exchanged with another in a given ratio?” is con-
stantly transformed into the entirely different one: “How is the price received for the product distrib-
uted between the factors of production?” ’ (D2/4, p. 4; emphasis added).
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For Sraffa, the classical objectivist notion of cost of production leads to an
asymmetric theory of distribution in which the distributive variables (particularly
wages and profits) are framed into different logical and chronological planes.
Sraffa’s reconstruction of the classical approach implies that real wages consist
of the commodities that capitalist-entrepreneurs must advance to workers in
order to put them in a condition to start and accomplish the labour activity. By con-
trast, profits (in real terms) consist of the amount of commodities which emerge at
the end of production as surplus or net product and which are the exclusive prop-
erty of capitalist-entrepreneurs. The chronological asymmetry between wages and
profits reflects an asymmetry in the distribution of property rights between workers
and capitalist-entrepreneurs. Workers have the right only to subsistence and, once
they have received it in the form of wages, they give up any right to the final
product that will emerge at the end of production. Capitalist-entrepreneurs, once
they have paid wages to workers, have the exclusive right to the final product,
both the part that is to be set aside in order to start the next production cycle
and the remaining part that constitutes profits:
Petty and all the classics [. . .] regard [wages] as a necessary means of enabling
the worker to perform his work. The food and the clothing of the worker are
equally necessary as his tools and raw materials. [. . .] In other words, the
wages of the worker belong to the same class of necessities as the fuel of
machines or the hay of horses. [. . .] This view leads to a conception of wages
and profits as two things of a radically different nature. Wages are a stock of
goods that exists before production and which is destroyed during the productive
process: they come thus to be identified with capital or at least with an important
part of capital. Profits (and rents of course) are a part of the product, and pre-
cisely the excess of the product over the initial stock. All the product belongs
to the capitalist, who has advanced the wages: out of it he draws his profits
and uses the rest to replace the capital consumed, thus replenishing the wages
fund to be used in the following process of production. There never is at any
one moment of time a division of the product between capitalist and worker;
their incomes are received at the opposite ends in time of the period of pro-
duction in relation to which they are paid. (D2/4, pp. 23–24; emphasis added)
By contrast, Sraffa argues, the subjectivist notion of cost of production leads
to a symmetrical theory of distribution in which the distributive variables are all
framed into logical and chronological parallel planes. The symmetry on the
logical plane derives from the fact that marginalist economists assume that the
productive employment of each economic resource, be it labour or land or
capital, entails a loss of utility to its owner.15 Therefore, for Sraffa, marginalist
15According to Sraffa, Senior’s theory of abstinence marks the turning point towards the symmetrical
view of distribution. While Smith, in some passages of the Wealth of Nations, had associated the
supply of human labour with the ‘toil and trouble’ suffered by the workers, Senior associates the
supply of capital with the capitalist’s abstinence from present consumption: ‘The fundamental
change in point of view was brought about by Senior, whose Political Economy was published in
1836. For Senior, wages and profit are to be considered as the reward of peculiar sacrifices, the
former the remuneration for labour, and the latter for abstinence from immediate enjoyment’
(D2/4, p. 39).
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economists are obliged to consider wages, as well as rents and profits, as the
monetary incentives necessary to induce workers, landlords and capitalists-
entrepreneurs to allocate their resources to production. To clarify the difference
between the classical economists and Marshall on the definition of wages, a differ-
ence entailed by their different views on cost of production, Sraffa makes use of an
illuminating metaphor: ‘To visualize this distinction you may conceive the wages
in Marshall’s sense as the carrot which you show to a donkey to induce it to run;
the wages in the classics’ sense to the other carrots which you must actually give to
the donkey for eating, before there is any question of inducement, just to keep it
alive’ (D2/4, p. 23).
As Sraffa perceptively noted, while in the classical theoretical world wage-
goods must necessarily exist before production begins, in Marshall’s theoretical
world this constraint is not binding. All that is necessary is that workers have
the prospect of gaining a sufficient monetary reward for their labour to balance
the disutility of working. Needless to add, the same psychological mechanism
must hold also for the two other types of individual actors in the production
scene, capitalist-entrepreneurs and landlords:
For Marshall [wages, interest and profit] are the inducement required to call
forth certain sacrifices, which are equally necessary for production, and they
are also the reward of those sacrifices. Their importance to production is
equally subordinate: what is really necessary for producing is only the efforts,
not their rewards. It is not necessary for the actual goods which compose real
wages and profits to be in existence at the beginning of the process of
production—the hope, or the promise of these goods is equally effective as an
inducement. They operate on production only by being expected, but they
come into existence only when production is finished, as shares in the
product. (D2/4, pp. 22–23; emphasis added)
If in the classical theoretical world the chronological asymmetry between
wages and profits reflects an asymmetry in the distribution of property rights
between workers and capitalist-entrepreneurs, in the Marshallian theoretical
world the chronological symmetry between wages and profits reflects the
symmetry in the distribution of property rights between workers and capitalists-
entrepreneurs. Marshallian workers, as much as Marshallian capitalists-
entrepreneurs, have the right to a well-defined share on the final product.
In short, within the Marshallian theoretical world wages and profits are simply
coordinate shares in the final product.
Given Sraffa’s historiographical thesis concerning the meta-scientific reasons
that explain the ready acceptance of marginal utility theories among orthodox
economists in the second half of the nineteenth century (see Section 3 above), it
should come as no surprise that Sraffa uses the categories of logical and chrono-
logical asymmetries to depict the classical theory of distribution and the categories
of logical and chronological symmetries to depict the Marshallian theory.
The classical asymmetries on the planes of logic and time versus the Marshallian
symmetries for Sraffa simply are the translation in the language of formal
economic models of the asymmetry versus the symmetry on the political plane
foreshadowed by the two theories.
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6. Final Remarks
This paper has analysed Sraffa’s unpublished Lectures on the Advanced Theory of
Value 1928–1931 and two preparatory Notes of summer and November 1927 in
order to provide a rational reconstruction of his view on the nature of pure
economics and the pattern of its development through time. The paper has also
discussed Sraffa’s interpretation of the classical and marginalist concepts of
cost of production and distribution.
The paper has shown that in the Lectures Sraffa proposes an original
interpretation of the history of economic thought in order to criticize the Marshal-
lian view on the nature and the scope of the theory of value and its history. Sraffa
advances three claims: (i) the theory of value is not an intellectual game since it
was originally elaborated and consistently used to provide general solutions to
concrete economic and political questions; (ii) the Marshallian theory of value
is not the only scientifically correct theory of value since past economists have
investigated non-Marshallian quæsita by means of non-Marshallian tools; and
(iii) the duty of historians of economics is to detect and evaluate the philosophical
and analytical features that characterize the different approaches to the problem of
value and distribution, in particular the objectivist approach of classical econom-
ists and the subjectivist one of marginalist economists.
Furthermore, the paper has investigated the reasons for Sraffa’s focus on the
concepts of cost of production and distribution as the fields upon which to measure
the theoretical distance separating the classical and the marginalist approaches.
The proposed interpretation is that, for Sraffa, the notion of cost of production
underwent a drastic semantic shift in the transition from the classical approach
to the marginalist one and that the two different notions of cost of production
underlie two different theories of distribution. Sraffa describes the classical
notion of cost of production as a magnitude which, unlike the marginalist
notion, has a strictly objective nature and which can be observed and directly
measured. Moreover, Sraffa claims that the classical notion of cost of production,
unlike the marginalist notion, leads to an asymmetric theory of distribution in
which the distributive variables are framed into different logic and chronologic
planes. The crucial issue is that the classical chronological asymmetry between
wages and profits reflects an asymmetry in the distribution of property rights
between workers and capitalist-entrepreneurs, an asymmetry that is alien to the
marginalist theoretical world.
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